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Abstract 
In 1993, Beimel and Chor presented an unconditionally secure interactive protocol which 
allows a subset of users in a network to establish a common key. This scheme made use 
of a key predisttibution scheme due to Blom. In this paper, we describe some variations and 
generalizations of the Beimel-Chor scheme, including broadcast encryption schemes as well as 
interactive key distribution schemes. Our constructions use the key predistribution scheme of 
Blundo et al., which is a generalization of the Blom scheme. We obtain families of schemes in 
which the amount of secret information held by the network users can be traded off against the 
amount of information that needs to be broadcast. We also consider lower bounds for protocols 
of these types, using the concept of entropy as our main tool. Some of our schemes are optimal 
(or close to optimal) with respect to the bounds we prove. @ 1998-Elsevier Science B.V. All 
rights reserved 
Keywords: Broadcast encryption; Interactive key distribution; Communication; Space; Entropy 
1. Introduction 
When a subset of users in a network wishes to communicate privately in conference, 
encryption algorithms can be employed to provide security against eavesdropping. If 
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conventional (private-key) cryptography is used, a common key must be shared by the 
members of the conference, which we call the privileged subset. 
One solution is to use a key predistrib~tio~ scheme (KPS) in which secret informa- 
tion is given to each user by a trusted authority in such a way that specified privileged 
subsets can compute a secret key. One such scheme was described by Blom [3], in 
which there is a secret key associated with each pair of users. By giving each user 
w + 1 pieces of secret info~ation~ any of the resulting secret keys is unconditionally 
secure against a coalition of size w. A generalization of Blom’s method can be found 
in [5], and a survey of key predistribution schemes can be found in [lo]. 
A different approach is to use a broadcast encryption scheme (BES), in which 
the TA broadcasts an encrypted version of a conference key, whose value can be 
decrypted only by members of the privileged subset. (Unconditionally secure) broadcast 
enc~ption was first introduced by Fiat and Naor [8], and has been further studied in 
E4,101. 
A third approach is for the members of the privileged set to interactively compute 
a secret conference key by exchanging messages among themselves. Of course, there 
are many such schemes that are computationally secure, going back to the Diffie- 
Heliman scheme. (One nice conference scheme was recently described by Bu~ester 
and Desmedt 163.) Unconditionally secure schemes for conference key agreement have 
been studied by Beimel and Chor [I, 21 (see also [4]). We will call such a scheme 
an interactive key distribution scheme (IKDS). An IKDS typically consists of a key 
predistribution phase (which requires a trusted authority), followed by an interactive 
communication phase among the conference pa~icipants (which does not involve the 
trusted authority). 
In this paper, we present new constructions for BES and IKDS. These schemes are 
one-time schemes in that they can be used for only a single broadcast (in the case 
of BES) or to establish only one key (in the case of IKDS). Hence, we will use the 
acronyms OTBES and OTIKDS, respectively. One situation in which this would be 
very appropriate is if the key that is being established is a (long-tee) master key. 
We should also note, however, that one-time schemes can generally be modified in a 
straightforward way to obtain z-time schemes; see [ 1,4], for example. 
Our new schemes allow a trade-off between communication and storage. In general, 
a smaller broadcast size can be accomplished if the participants have more secret 
info~ation, and vice versa. One of the main purposes of this paper is to examine and 
quantify these trade-offs. 
It should be evident hat we are interested in unconditionally secure schemes in this 
paper, i.e., schemes that do not depend on any computational ssumptions. Although 
these schemes require a trusted authority, they are nevertheless extremely efficient 
computationally. There is also some benefit in using an unconditionally secure key 
distribution mechanism, even if the key is to be subsequently used in a conventional, 
computationally secure cryptosystem such as DES. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formally define key pre- 
distribution schemes and broadcast encryption schemes in terms of the entropy 
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function. In Section 3, we give a brief description of the key predistribution scheme 
in [5]. In Section 4, we present two constructions for one-time broadcast encryption 
schemes. The first is based on combinatorial structures called resolvable designs; the 
other is realized using polynomial interpolation. In Section 5 we prove several lower 
bounds that quantify the trade-off between the amount of secret information held by 
the users in a one-time broadcast encryption scheme and the size of the broadcast, 
and discuss how close our schemes our to meeting these bounds. In Section 6, we 
present our constructions for one-time interactive key distribution schemes. Finally, in 
Section 7, we consider the amount of secret information held by the users and the 
amount of communication in our schemes, as well as deriving lower bounds for these 
quantities. 
2. Mathematical models 
2. I. Key predistribution schemes 
We begin by discussing key predistribution schemes, since we will be using these as 
building blocks in our consideration of broadcast encryption schemes and interactive 
key distribution scheme. 
Our model is essentially the same as the one in [5]. It consists of a trusted authority 
(TA) and a set of users @={1,2,..., n}. We assume that network is a broadcast 
channel, i.e., any information transmitted by the TA (or by a user in the network) 
will be received by every user. It is assumed to be insecure against passive attacks, 
i.e., the information that is broadcast can be observed by anyone. However, we will 
assume that the network is secure against active attacks. (In practice, we could obtain 
protection against active attacks by using an unconditionally secure authentication code 
to authenticate all information that is broadcast.) 
In a key predistribution scheme, the TA generates and distributes secret information 
to each user. The information given to user i is denoted by U; and must be distributed 
“off-band” (i.e., not using the network) in a secure manner. For 1 <i <n, let Ui denote 
the set of all possible secret values that might be distributed to user i by the TA. For 
any subset of users X C @, let LJx denote the Cartesian product Ui, x . . . x Ui,, where 
X={il,..., ij} and il < . . <ii. We assume that there is a probability distribution on 
Ua, and the TA chooses uy E Ue according to this probability distribution. This secret 
information will enable various privileged subsets to compute keys, 
Let 2” denote the set of all subsets of users. 9’ (I 2”# will denote the collection of 
all privileged subsets to which the TA is distributing keys. 9 C 2” will denote the 
collection of all possible coalitions (called forbidden subsets) against which each key 
is to remain secure. 
Once the secret information is distributed, each user i in a privileged set P should 
be able to compute the key kp associated with P. On the other hand, no forbidden set 
FE F disjoint from P should be able to compute any information about kp. 
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The desired properties can be described mathematically using the entropy function 
(see [7] for basic terminology and results on information theory). We say that the 
scheme is a (9,9)-key predistribution scheme (or (9,F)-ICI’S) provided the follow- 
ing conditions are satisfied: 
(KFSl ) Each user i in any privileged set P can compute kp: H(Kp] Ui) = 0 for all 
iEP, PEY. 
(IWS2) No forbidden subset F disjoint from a privileged subset P has 
any information on kp: H(K~)=H(K~IUF) for all P E 9 and FE F such that 
PnF=@ 
Usually, we will be considering schemes where 9 consists of all t-subsets of @, 
and 9 consists of all subsets of u2d of size at most w. Such a ICI’S will be denoted as 
a (t, w)-KPS. 
2.2. Broadcast encryption schemes 
We now turn to the notion of a one-time broadcast encryption scheme. We describe 
the model from [lo] (a slightly different model, which is not a one-time scheme, is 
presented in [4]). In our model, there is an initial set-up phase in which the TA 
distributes secret information to the network users, just as in a key predistribution 
system. As before, we denote the secret information given to user i by Ui. 
At a later time, the TA will want to broadcast a message (i.e., a plaintext) to a 
privileged subset P. We will let .9’s 2% denote the collection of all privileged subsets 
to which the TA might want to broadcast a message. The particular privileged subset 
P E 9 to which the TA will broadcast a message is, in general, not known ahead of 
time. 
The message to be broadcast to P will be denoted as mp, and is chosen by the TA 
from a specified set Mp according to a specified probability distribution on A4p. Then 
the broadcast bp (which is an element of a specified set Bp) is computed as a function 
of mp and up. 
Once bp is broadcast, each user i E P should be able to decrypt bp and obtain mp. 
On the other hand, we will desire that the broadcast should be secure against specified 
coalitions. 9 2 2* will denote the collection of all possible forbidden subsets against 
which a broadcast is to remain secure. We require that no FE 9 disjoint from P 
should be able to compute any information about mp. 
As mentioned above, we discuss the security in terms of a single broadcast, so 
we call the scheme “one-time”. Here is a formal definition. We say that the scheme 
is a (9,9)-one-time broadcast encryption scheme (or (8,F)-OTBES) provided the 
following conditions are satisfied: 
(OTBESO) Without knowing the broadcast, no subset of users has any information 
about mp, even given all the secret information Uq: 
for all P E 8. 
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(OTBES 1) The message for a privileged user is uniquely determined by the broadcast 
and the user’s secret information 
for all iE P, PEP. 
(OTBES2) After receiving the broadcast, no forbidden subset F disjoint from P has 
any information on mp: 
H(MP) = H(MP 1 UFBP) 
for all PEP and FEF such that PnF=P). 
As with KPS, we will be considering OTBES where privileged sets have size t 
and forbidden sets have size (at most) w; the notation (t, w)-OTBES will be used to 
describe this scenario. 
3. The KPS of Blundo et al. and its properties 
We will be using the key predistribution scheme of Blom [3], and the generalization 
of Blundo et al. [5], so we give a brief description of these schemes now. Since the 
KPS of Blundo et al. is a generalization of Blom’s scheme, we do not need to discuss 
Blom’s scheme explicitly. (When we set t = 2 in the Blundo et al. scheme, the Blom 
scheme is obtained.) 
The Blundo et al. scheme is a (1, w)-KPS. Let p be a prime such that pan (the 
number of users). The TA chooses n distinct random numbers Si E Z,, and gives si to 
user i (1 <i <n). These values s; do not need to be secret. Thus, for example, it is 
sufficient to take si = i for 1 <i <II. 
Next, the TA the constructs a random symmetric polynomial in t variables with 
coefficients from Z,, in which the degree of any variable is at most w: 
f(x1 ,...,Xy)= 2 . . . 2 Ui ,,,,_, i,Xli’ . . .xtit. 
iI =0 i,=O 
The fact that f is symmetric is equivalent to saying that a,,,,,,,i, = an(i, ),,,,,n(il) for all 
permutations n of { 1,. . . , t}. 
Then, for 1 <i <n, the TA computes a polynomial gi in the t - 1 variables 
x2,. . . ,xt by setting x1 =si in f(xr,. . . , xl). The coefficients of gi comprise the secret 
information which is given to user i. The key associated with the t-subset 
P={il,...,&} is 
b=f(Si,, . . . . q)modp. 
Each user ij E P can compute 
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It can be shown that no subset of w users disjoint from P can compute any infor- 
mation about kp (see [S]). Also, it is not hard to see that 
WKP I= 1% P 
for all P E 8, and 
H(Ui)= (“,1; ‘) IOgp 
We will now prove an important property of this scheme, generalizing [ 1, Lemma 91. 
This result is based on the following lemma. 
Lemma 3.1. ~~~~0~~ we have a (t? w)-KPS ult a set 42 qf n users. S~~~~se X, YI , . . . , 
Y,, ZC”u, where jZ/=w, znx=0, znYi f 0 and /X/=jYij=t,for i=l,...,r. 
Then the following holds: 
Proof. The conditional mutual info~ation I(&; Ky, . . . Ky, / UZ) can be written either 
as 
H(Kx I Uz > - H(Kx IKY, . . . KY, uz > 
or as 
HWY, . . . K,jUz) - HWY, . ..K.jKdJz). 
Since Z f’ Yi # 8, from Property (KPSl) we obtain 
0 G H(&, . ..Kr.IKxUz) 
< WK, ..-Kr,lUz) 
=: 0. 
Hence, 
HK, . ..Ky./UZKx)=H(Ky, . ..Ky.jUZ)=O. 
Therefore, 
H(Kx /KY, . . . KY, f?z > = ffKx I uz). 
Moreover, since Z I-X = 0 and /Z/ = w, from Property (KPS2) we obtain H(KxI UZ) = 
H(Kx ) which completes the proof. Cl 
Here is the result that we will require later. 
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Lemma 3.2. Suppose we have an (c!, t + w - Q-KPS, where e d t. Let P and F two 
sets of t and w users, respectively, such that P n F = 0. Let a = (:) and let Y,, . , Y, 
be all the subsets of P of cardinality e. Then 
HWY, . . . KY, I UF) = 5 HWY, 1. 
j=l 
Proof. For 1 <i <cc, let Ai = (P U F)\K. We have the following: 
5 WKY, > > HWY, . . . KY, > 
j=l 
2 WKY, . ..&lh) 
= WKY, 1 UF > + 5 HWY, KY, . ..KY._,~F) 
j=2 
3 H(KY,IUA,)+ fJf(KqlK~, . ..KY._,&,) 
j=2 
= 5 H(Ky,) (from Lemma 3.1) 
j=l 
Hence, the result follows. 0 
The above lemma states that the secret information held by the coalition F reveals 
no information about the CY keys held by the !-subsets of P. In fact, in the case of 
the Blundo et al. scheme, we can say a bit more. We have already noted that, in the 
Blundo et al. scheme, each key is equally likely to take on any value in Z,. From this, 
it will follow in Lemma 3.3 that, given the secret information held by the coalition F, 
every possible 8-tuple of keys held by the e-subsets of P occurs with equal probability 
P +. Notice that the following lemma holds for every KPS in which all the keys are 
uniformly distributed over Z,. 
Lemma 3.3. Suppose we have a (t + w - 8, L)-KPS of Blundo et al., where L d t. Let 
P and F two sets of t and w users, respectively, such that P n F = 8. Let CI = (:) 
and let Y,,..., Y, be all the subsets of P of cardinality e. Let kl, . . , k, be arbi- 
trary elements of Z,, and let uF be the secret information given to the subset F. 
Then 
~(KY, =kl,..., Ky3=k,)=p(Ky,=k ,,..., Kyx=k&JF=u;)=$- 
Proof. We have the following: 
HW, . ..KY.IUF) = eH(Ky,) (from Lemma 3.2) 
j=l 
= ,z 1% IhI 
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= log ii lKYjl 
j=l 
= log /KY, x . ’ . x KY, 1. 
Moreover, we have that 
H(Ky, . . . KYz I= ff(KY, . ..Ky*IljF)= loglKy, x ... x&J. 
(This is due to the fact that 
HWY, . . . KY, ) b H(Ky, . ..Ky./L$)= log IKy, x ... x Kyxl 
and 
HWY~ . ..Ky_)<log/Ky. x .I* xKyz/.) 
Now, by definition, we have that H(Ky, . . . KY*) = log IKy, x . . . x KY~ 1 if and only 
if 
p(Ky, =k,,...,Ky*=k,)= 
1 
lKy, x ..’ xK,j 
Therefore, we have that 
M-Y, =h,..., KyT=kor) = p(Ky, =k,,...,Ky,=k,lUF=uF) 
1 =: 
IKy, x ..’ xKy,/’ 
where the first equality is justified by H(Ky, . . . KyY) = H(Ky, . . . KY, 1 UF). 
Since all the keys are equiprobable lements of Z,, we get 
PWY, =k,..., Ky~=k~)=p(Ky,=k~,...,Ky~=k,lU~=u~)=$. 
This completes the proof. il 
Remark. In the case e = 2, this is the result stated in [ 1, Lemma 91. 
4. One-time broadcast encrypthn schemes 
4. I. A construction using resolvable designs 
In this section, we present a construction for OTBES that makes use of the combi- 
natorial structures called “resolvable designs”. We briefly recall some definitions and 
results from design theory that we will use. A design is a pair (Y,@), where Y is a 
set of rr elements (called points) and .c@ is a set of subsets of V of a fixed size k, 
where k B 2, (called biocks). A parallel class of (I’, 53) consists of n/k blocks from 
.C$ which partition the set V. The design (V,B) is said to resolvable if the set of 
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blocks, .2J’, can be partitioned into parallel classes. If 2? consists of all k-subsets of V, 
then (V, B) is called the complete k-uniform hypergraph on V. 
We will employ the following famous theorem of Baranyai, a proof of which can 
be found in [9, Theorem 36.11, for example. 
Theorem 4.1 (Baranyai’s Theorem). The complete k-unzyorm hypergraph on n points 
is resolvable if n zz 0 mod k. 
We note that the resolutions of the designs in Theorem 4.1 can be found efficiently. 
We are going to construct a (t, w)-OTBES. Suppose that e 2 1 is an integer such 
that t E Omod e. The set-up phase consists of the TA distributing secret informa- 
tion corresponding to a (t, t + w - G)-KPS of Blundo et al. implemented over Z,, 
p prime. For an &-subset of users A, we denote by kA the key associated with the 
subset A. 
Before describing the general scheme, we consider the extremal case / = t as a 
simple example. In this case, there is a key kp associated with each set P of size t. 
The message to be broadcast to P will be an element mp E Z,. The TA encrypts mp 
using the key kp by defining bp = kp + mp mod p. Clearly, any user h E P can decrypt 
the broadcast by computing mp = bp - kp modp. Note that this particular case does not 
require the use of Theorem 4.1. 
Now we describe the general scheme. Suppose that the TA wishes to broadcast 
a message to a privileged set P of cardinality t. Consider the complete /-uniform 
hypergraph defined on point set P. By Theorem 4.1, the (j) blocks in this design can be 
partitioned into r = (:I:) parallel classes. (This partition can be precomputed if desired, 
and can be public knowledge.) We will denote the parallel classes by Cl,. . , C,, and 
we will denote the blocks in Ci by Bi,j) 1 d ibr, 1 <j < t/e. 
There is a key kB8,, associated with every block Bi,j. The message to be broadcast 
to P will be an element of (Z,)r, say 
mp=(ml,...,m,). 
The TA encrypts each ltzi using the t/d keys kB,,,, by defining 
bi.j = ks,, + mi mod P, 
1 <i <r, 1 <j < t/t. Then the broadcast bp is 
bp=(bl,l,...,bl,t/r,b2,1,...,b2,1//,...,br,l,...,br,tjr). 
Let us see how any user h E P can decrypt the broadcast. For each i, 16 i <r, there 
is a block Bi,h, E Ci such that h E Bi,h,. Thus, h can compute all the keys kB,,,$ , 1 < i < r. 
Then it is a simple matter for h to compute 
mi = bi,h, - ks, b mod P, 1 <i<r. * I 
Here is a small example to illustrate. 
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Example 4.1. Assume that t = 6 and L = 2. Let P = { 1,2,3,4,5,6} The (i) = 15 pairs 
of users in P can be partitioned into 5 disjoint parallel classes, as follows: 
Cl = {{5,6},{1,4},{2,3}}, 
C2 = {{5,1},{2,6},{3,4}}, 
c3 = {{5,2),{3,1), 14,611, 
c4 = {{5,3),{1,6),{2,4)), 
G = {{5,4},{3,6},{1,2}}. 
Suppose the TA wants to broadcast the message 
mp=(ml,m2,m3,m4,m5>E(Z,)5 
to the users in P. The broadcast bp is the concatenation of the following 15 values: 
k{5,6} + ml, k{1,4} + ml, k{2,3} f ml, 
k{l,5} + m2, k{2,6} + m2, k{3,4} + m2, 
k{2,5} + m3, k{1,3} + m3, k{4,6} f m3, 
$3,5} f m49 k{l,6} f m4, k{2,4} + m4, 
k{4.5} f m5y k{3,6} + m5, k{l,2} + % 
where all addition is modulo p. 
Let us see how user 3 will decrypt the broadcast. This user knows the five keys 
k{l,3}, k{2,3}, k{3,4}, k{3,5} and k{3,6}, and hence he or she can perform the following 
calculations: 
ml = bt,3 - k{2,3} mod p, 
m2 = b2,3 - k{s,q mod p, 
m3 = b3,2 - k{l,q mod p, 
m4 = b4,1 - k{3,5) mod p, 
m5 = b5,2 - k{3,6) mod p. 
4.2. Security of the scheme 
We now discuss the security of the scheme. It is intuitively clear that a coalition of 
w users disjoint form a privileged set P has no information about mp after observation 
of the broadcast, even if they pool all their secret information. This is because of the 
property, which we proved in Lemma 3.3, that the (i) keys k,,, appear to them to 
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be independent random elements of Z,. Each of these keys is used to encrypt one 
element of Z,, and thus these keys function as a big one-time pad. A formal proof 
of the security of the scheme can be obtained by a straightforward modification of the 
one given in [2]. 
4.3. A construction using polynomial interpolation 
In this section, we describe a variation of the scheme which allows us to remove 
the congruential condition t E Omod e. This is accomplished by using polynomial 
interpolation in place of the resolvable design from Section 4.1. The resulting scheme 
is a bit more complicated, however. 
The set-up phase will be the same as before: the TA distributes secret information 
corresponding to a (e, t + w - 8)-KPS of Blundo et al. implemented over Z,, p 
prime. Now, however, we will require that p> (:) f or reasons that will be evident 
shortly. 
As before, there is a key kA the associated with every e-subset of a privileged 
set P of cardinality t. Each user in P possesses Y = (:I:) of these R = (:) keys. 
Now suppose that the TA wishes to broadcast a message to the privileged set P. Let 
XI,..., XR be distinct elements of Z,. (These R values can be publicly known; xi = i-- 1, 
1 <id R will do perfectly well.) 
The message to be broadcast to P will be an element of (Z,)‘, say 
mp=(ml,...,m,). 
Define the polynomial m(x) E Z,[x] to be 
r-1 
m(X) = C 77Zi+lX’. 
i=O 
The TA computes 
yi = m(xi) mod p, 
1 <i <R. Then the TA “encrypts” each yi by computing 
bi = yi + ki mod p, 
1 <id R. Then the broadcast bp is 
b,==(bl,...,bR). 
We have already noted that each privileged user i possesses r of the keys kl, . . . , kR. 
Hence, user i can compute Y points on the polynomial m(x) and thus can reconstruct 
m(x) by polynomial interpolation. Then the coefficients of m(x) are the plaintext mes- 
sage. 
On the other hand, from the point of view of a coalition of w users, the R = (:) 
elements of the broadcast convey no information since the R y-values have all been 
encrypted by using what appear to be R independent random keys. 
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5. Entropy bounds for OTBES 
5.1. Lower bounds on entropy 
We are interested in the amount of secret information held by the users in an OTBES, 
as well as the size of the broadcast. In general, there exists a trade-off between these 
quantities: one can achieve a small broadcast if the amount of secret information is 
large, and vice versa. In this section, we derive several bounds that quantify this trade- 
off. Our main result (Theorem 5.5) provides a lower bound on the information held 
by w users together with the broadcast size (in the case t > w -t 1). 
We begin with some preliminary lemmas. 
Lemma 5.1. In any (9,9)-OTBES, for any F E 9 and P E B such that P n F = 0, 
it holds that 
H(UiI UFBP) =H(MP) + H(UiI UFBPMP), 
for any i E P. 
Proof. The conditional mutual information I( Ui; Mp 1 UFBP) can be written either as 
H( Ui I UFBP) - H( Ui I UFBPMP > 
or as 
H(MPIUFBP) -H(M~IUFB~U~). 
Hence, 
From Property (OTBES2) we get 
HWP 1 UFBP I= HWP 1, 
whereas from 
we get 
H(Mp( U~Bpui) = 0 
(we used inequalities (A.2) and (A.4) and Property (OTBESl)). Therefore, we obtain 
H( Ui I UFBP) = H(MP > + H(Ui I UFBPMP > 
which proves the lemma. Cl 
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An immediate consequence of previous lemma is that, in any (9,9;)-OTBES, it 
hofds that HUH for any P E 9 and any i E P. Setting F = @ and inter- 
changing the role of Bp and Ui in the previous Lemma, we can easily prove the 
following: 
Lemma 5.2. In any (9, ,F)-OTBES, it holds that H(Bp( U;) = H(Mp) + H(Bpj Uikfp) 
fbr any PEP and any REP. 
A consequence of property (OTBESO) is the following. 
Lemma 5.3. In any (9, g)-OTBES it holds that H(A4pI Up) = H(Mp) for any P E 9 
and any Q C 99. 
Lemma 5.4. In any (9, S)-OTBES, for any P, Q,R 2 { 1,2, _. . ,n} it holds that 
Proof. Consider the conditional mutual information Z(U~;Mpltl,). From (A.5) and 
Lemma 5.3 we have that 
H(UQIUR)-H(UQIURMP) = Z(UQ;MPIUR) 
= z(MP;uQIuR) 
= H(Mp) - HWP) 
which proves the lemma. Cl 
Now we proceed to the main result of this section. The following theorem holds 
for arbitrary entropies on the message spaces M p, but for clarity we will state it for 
the simpler case where H(Mp) = H(Mpt ) for all P, P’ E 9. We denote this common 
entropy by H(M). 
Theorem 5.5. Suppose we have a (t,w)-OTBES, where t&w + 1. Then, for any 
P={il,..., it} C a!, it holds that 
H(Bp) + 5 H(UjJa(2w + l)H(M). 
j=I 
Proof. Let 
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where IAI=t-1. Forj=1,2 ,..., W, set 6 = {ij} U A. Consider the conditional entropy 
H(Ui, .s. lJi,IUi,+,). We have 
H(ui,...ul_Ici,+,) = H(Ui,(Ui,+,)+ cH(uiJjUi, . ..V.,_,Uiw+,) 
j=2 
(from (A.3)) 
2 H(Ui,(uiw+,BP,)+ eH(CS,IUi, ...ui,_,uiw+,B~) 
j=2 
(from (A.6)) 
(from Lemma 5.1 and (A.2)) 
= wH(A4). 
On the other hand, we have also 
H(Ui, e. . Ui,+) Ui,,, ) = H( Ui, . . . Ui,)Ui,+lA4p) (from Lemma 5.4) 
< H(BpUi, . . . Ui,IUiii,+,MP) 
(from (A.3) and (A.2)) 
G H(BpIUI,+,Mp) + eH(U,IBpMp) 
j=l 
(from (A.3) and (A.6)) 
= H(BpIUiw+,)-H(M~)+ ~[H(U,IBp)-ffH(Mp)l 
(from Lemmas 5.2 andi.1) 
< H(BP) + $‘J ff<ui, I- (W + l)H(M) 
j=l 
(from (A.4)). 
Therefore, we get 
H(BP) + 2 H( Vi,)2 (2~ + l)H(M), 
j=l 
which proves the theorem. 0 
5.2. The entropy of our schemes 
We measure the efficiency of our constructions by considering the amount of se- 
cret information stored by each user as compared to the information content of the 
broadcast; and the size of the broadcast as compared to its information content. 
Hence, we consider the following quantities: 
H(Ui) 
I;‘=H(M)’ 
C. Blundo et al. I Theoretical Computer Science 200 (1998) 313-334 327 
l<i<n, and 
H(BP) 
r& = H(M). 
(Note that these quantities are the reciprocals of information rates as defined in [lo].) 
It is easy to see that r; 2 1 provided that i is a member of at least one privileged 
set. Also, rBp > 1. It is easy to construct schemes in which ri = 1 for 1 <i <n, and it is 
also trivial to construct schemes in which rBP = 1 (see [lo], for example). However, as 
mentioned previously, the results of Section 5 show that there is a trade-off between ri 
and rB,: if one is “small” then the other must be “large”. In particular, if we rephrase 
Theorem 5.5 in terms of the notation defined above, we have the following result. 
Theorem 5.6. In any (t,w)-OTBES with t >w + 1, 
rBp+gri,a2W+1 
j=l 
We look now at the constructions for (t, w)-OTBES that we presented in Sections 
4.1 and 4.3. These two constructions are identical from the point of view of the amount 
of secret information required and the size of the broadcast. So the following analysis 
applies to both constructions. 
Let us consider the case where a message is a random element of (Z,)“, where 
r = (:I:). Then 
of course. Since the secret information is that of a (t + w - 8, a)-KPS of Blundo et al. 
we have that 
H(Ui)= (‘:r, ‘) lOgP 
for 1 <i <n. Also, it is easy to see that 
H@P I= 0 ; 1% P. 
Performing some simple arithmetic, we have the following result. 
Theorem 5.7. Let G be an integer such that 168 <t. Then there exists a (t, w)- 
OTBES with 
(‘y-y’) 
“I(:-:)’ 
1 Gidn, and 
t 
rB, = -. 
e 
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Of course, we are free to choose e however we wish. If we wanted to minimize 
ui, we would choose e = 1. The resulting (trivial) scheme has T; = 1, which is optimal. 
If we wanted to minimize rBp, we would choose e = t, yielding rep = 1, also optimal. 
But if we wanted to see how close we can get to attaining the bound of Theorem 5.6, 
we should choose some intermediate value of L’. 
As an example, suppose we consider the case w = 1. We know from Theorem 5.6 
that ri + rB, > 3 in any (t, 1 )-OTBES. Our construction allows us to construct a scheme 
in which 
r, + rB _ U + (9 t(t + 1) 
I P- 
K:) =e(t-t+l)’ 
We minimize ri + r&, by choosing e as follows: 
e= 
!$ if t is odd, 
t 
2 if t is even. 
These choices for e yield the following: 
ri + rBp < 
if t is odd, 
if t is even. 
In particular, for t = 2,3, we get a (t, I)-OTBES with ri + rB, = 3, which is optimal. 
For larger t, we always have ri + r& <4, which is not too far away from the lower 
bound r-j + rep 3 3. 
6. Interactive key distribution schemes 
We now turn our attention to one-time interactive key distribution schemes. We will 
use the model described by Beimel and Chor in [l]. 9 is the set of privileged subsets 
and 9 is the set of forbidden subsets, as before. There is an initial distribution of 
secret information by the TA, followed by a sequence of messages broadcast by the 
members of a privileged set P E 9’. At the end of the protocol, every member of P 
should be able to compute the same key, mp, while no coalition F E 9 disjoint from P 
should have any information about mp. A scheme of this type is called a (P’,P)-one- 
time interactive key distribution scheme, or (P’,B)-OTIKDS. Observe that a (P’,P)- 
OTIKDS should satisfy axioms (OTBESI) and (OTBES2) if we define bp to consist 
of all the messages exchanged during the interactive protocol. 
In general, the messages exchanged among the members in P can depend on previ- 
ous messages, and there may be several rounds of communication. In this paper, we 
construct schemes of a very special type, termed “non-reactive” by Beimel and Chor. 
In a non-reactive scheme, every member i E P independently chooses a value mi, and 
uses his or her secret information, Ui, to compute an encrypted version of mi, denoted 
by bi, which is then broadcast. Thus, a non-reactive OTIKDS can be thought of as 
C. Blundo et al. I Theoretical Computer Science 200 (1998) 313-334 329 
several independent executions of a one-time broadcast encryption scheme, with each 
privileged user in turn broadcasting a message that can be decrypted only by the other 
privileged users. 
In a non-reactive OTIKDS, the key mp for the privileged set P consists of the 
concatenation of all the values mi, i E P: 
mp = (mi, , . . . , mi, 1, 
where P = {il , . . . , it}, il < . . . <i,. The broadcast is 
bp=(bi,,...,bi,). 
6.1. Constructions 
In this section, we present a non-reactive (t,w)-OTIKDS which uses the (t, w)- 
OTBES constructed from resolvable designs in Section 4.1. Our construction will con- 
tain the Beimel-Chor scheme as a special case. 
Suppose that L’ 3 2 is an integer such that t E 1 mod (8 - 1). The set-up phase consists 
of the TA distributing secret information corresponding to a (8, t+w-L)-KPS of Blundo 
et al. implemented over (Z,,)“, p prime. For an e-subset of users A, we denote by 
kA the key associated with the subset A. We will think of kA as being made up of e 
independent keys over Z,, which we will denote by kA,l, . . . , kA,e. 
Suppose that the privileged set P wishes to interactively construct a common key. 
Each user h E P will perform the following steps. 
1. h chooses a random value mh = (mf,. . . , rn!) E (Z,>r, where r = (:I;). 
2. Since t E 1 mod (8 - 1 ), Theorem 4.1 guarantees that the complete (8 - 1 )-uniform 
hypergraph on P\(h) can be partitioned into r parallel classes, each of which 
consists of (t - 1 )/(/ - 1) blocks. Denote these parallel classes by CF, . . . , C,“, and 
denote the blocks in C/’ by Btj, 1 di<r, 1 <j<(t - l)/(e - 1). 
3. For each block Btj, denote 
where XI < . . . <xp, and let a,tj denote the index such that xah = h. 
4. User h encrypts each rnf using the (t - 1)/(8 - 1) keys kB;,,,.;:‘, by defining 
b: j = kBh c( h +mfmodp, lrl’ ‘,I 
1 <i<r, 1 <j<(t - I)/([ - 1). 
5. User h broadcasts the vector 
We should explain the purpose of the values atj. Their function is to ensure that 
every kA,j is used to encrypt exactly one of the mf’s. The proofs that every privileged 
user can compute mp and that no forbidden set of w users can compute any information 
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about mp are essentially the same as those used in studying the OTBES scheme in 
Section 4.1. 
We now present an example to illustrate the protocol. 
Example 6.1. Suppose that t = 5 and L = 3. Note that 5 = 1 mod 2. Suppose that the 
privileged set P={1,2,3,4,5}. 
For each user i E P, we partition the 2-subsets of P\(i) into Y = 3 disjoint parallel 
classes. Below, we describe only the ones related to user 3: 
C: = {{1,2},{4,5}}, 
C; = {{1,4},{2,5}}, 
C3 = 111,5),12,4]). 
Let us look at the computations to be performed by user 3. First, user 3 picks three 
random values (i.e., his or her part of the key), say rni,m&m: E Z,. Next, he or she 
computes the relevant M. values. These are as follows: 
&=3 &=l a;,=2 c&=2 c&=2 a;,=2 , ’ 1 ’ , ’ , ’ , ’ , . 
This determines the values that are broadcast by user 3: 
b3 = (m: + $,2,3},3?: + ~{3,4,~},~~~: + k{1,3,4},2> 
d + ‘+2,3,5},29; + k{1,3,5),2d + k{2,3,4},2). 
We observe that our construction reduces to the OTIKDS presented by Beimel and 
Chor in [l] when we choose 8 = 2. Also, we can modify the scheme in straightfor- 
ward manner by using the polynomial interpolation idea of Section 4.3 instead of the 
resolvable design approach of Section 4.1. This allows us to remove the congruential 
condition on &, but does not change the amount of secret information or the size of 
the broadcast. 
7. Entropy bounds for key distribution schemes 
7.1. A lower bound on entropy 
We define the quantities ri and r& for OTIKDS exactly as we did for OTBES. 
Beimel and Chor proved a lower bound on ri in [2]. We record this bound as 
follows. 
Theorem 7.1. In any (t,w)-OTZKDS, 
Ui>l+ w . 
L 1 t-1 
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7.2. The entropy of our schemes 
We look now at our ~ons~ction for (t,w)-OTIKDS. The key is a random element 
of (Z,)“, where r= (:I;). Hence 
H(M) = t 
We also have that 
H(U;:)=G (t;“, ‘) logp 
for l,<i<n, and 
H(Bp)=cf : logp. 0 
These values yield the following result. 
Theorem 7.2. Let 8 be an integer such 
OTXIIS with 
that 1 <c! < t. Then there exists a (t, w>- 
I <i,<n, and 
t-l 
rep = tp_l. 
We have already mentioned that the Beimel-Chor scheme is the special case 4 = 2. 
In this situation, we get 
r.-2+2(M’- 1) I 
t * 
For any values of t and w, it always happens in the Beimel-Chor scheme that ri 3 2. 
We observe that by using larger values of e, we can sometimes obtain values of ri 
very close to 1. As an illustration of a class of examples where this can be done, let 
us consider the case w = 1 in more detail. When w = 1, we see from Theorem 7.2 that 
Elementary algebra shows that ri(L’ + l)>ri(e) if and only if 
t<P+f-1. 
If t = e2 + Cp - 1 for some integer 8, we compute from Theorem 7.2 that ri = 1 + 2/Lp. 
Further, the lower bound for ri from Theorem 7.1 in this case is 
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Hence, our construction is very close to best possible for these values of t (when 
w=l). 
If t cannot be expressed as t = t2 + tf - 1 for some integer 4, then we can find a 
unique integer L such that 
e2 - /<t<F + 8. 
In this situation, Theorem 7.2 can be used to show that ri < 1+2/({ - 1). Summarizing, 
we obtain the following. 
Theorem 7.3. Let t > 2 be an integer. If t = d2 + t7 - 1 for some integer 8, then there 
exists a (t, l)-OTIKDS in which 
1 < i <n. Otherwise, 
e2-edtQe2+e 
for some integer e, and there exists a (t, 1 )-OTIKDS in which 
L 
ri<l+--, 
e-i 
In general, given t and w, we might want to know how to choose e so as to minimize 
ri when applying Theorem 7.2. This can be done as follows. Consider the ratio 
de> e2(t -e) 
r&e+ i)=(ez- i)(t+w-ej 
As a function of d, q(e) is decreasing as long as this ratio is at least one. This is 
equivalent to the condition 
e2w+e-(t+w)<0. 
The smaller root of this quadratic is negative, and the larger root is 
-1 +J4w2+4wt+ 1 
Y= 2w (1) 
Recalling that L 22 is an integer, we see that the quantity ri is minimized by taking 
e= 
i 
y or y + 1 if y is an integer, 
lrl + 1 otherwise. 
It is also easy to see that y > 1, with equality occurring if and only if t = 1. 
Recall that the case 8 = 2 corresponds to the Beimel-Chor construction. The optimal 
choice for 8 in Theorem 7.2 will be L’ = 2 whenever y <2. This happens if and only if 
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t < 3w + 2. In these parameter situations, the ratio between the upper and lower bounds 
for ri (as obtained in Theorems 7.2 and 7.1) is approximately two. 
When w = 1, the ratio between the upper and lower bounds approaches one as d 
increases. However, in other parameter situations, (i.e., t> 3w+3 and w &2), it appears 
difficult to even compute this ratio. We leave this as an open problem. 
Appendix 
In this appendix, we review the basic concepts of information theory used in this 
paper. For a complete treatment of the subject he reader is advised to consult [7]. 
Given a probability distribution {~(x)},~x on a set X, we define the entropy of X, 
H(X), as 
H(X) = - c P(X) 1% P(X) 
XEX 
(all logarithms in this paper are to the base 2). The entropy H(X) is a measure of the 
average uncertainty one has about which element of the set X has been chosen when 
the choices of the elements from X are made according to the probabili~ dis~ibution 
{P(X)LEX. The entropy satisfies the following property 
O<kqX)d logIX/, (A.11 
where I-I(X) = 0 if and only if there exists x0 E X such that p(q) = I; H(X) = log /XI 
if and only if p(x)= l//Xi, for all VEX. 
Given two sets X and Y and a joint probabili~ dis~bution { P(x,Y)}~~Q,~Y on 
their Cartesian product, the conditional entropy H(XjY) is defined as 
H(XIY) = - EEL P(Y)PHY) 1% P(h). 
From the de~nition of conditional entropy it is easy to see that 
N(XI Y) > 0. (A.21 
If we have n + 1 sets XI, . . . ,X,,, Y, the entropy of Xl . . .X, given Y can be expressed 
as 
H(X,..*X,~Y)=frl(X,/Y)+H(X*~X,Y)+*--+H(X,~X~...X,_,Y). (A.31 
The mutual information Z(X; Y) between X and Y is defined by 1(X; Y) =H(X) - 
H(XIY)=H(Y) -H(YIX), since it is always non-negative one gets 
H(X)BH(X/Y). (A.41 
Given n + 2 sets X,Y,Zl,..., Z,, and a joint probability dis~bution on their Cartesian 
product, the conditional mutual information 1(X; Yl.2’1. . .Z,) between X and Y given 
2, . . Z,, can be written as 
Z(X;YIZ, . ..Z.)=H(XIZ, . ..Z*)-N(XIZ* . ..Z.Y). (A.51 
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Since the conditional mutual information is always non-negative we get 
H(X1.G . ..Z.)>H(XlZ, . ..Z.Y). (A.61 
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